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| William Colombia                      | Director of                                         | Top Secret      |
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## **National Intelligence Daily**

Tuesday 18 January 1983

Top Secret

CPAS NID 83-015JX

18 January 1983


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| ITALY-US: Defense Minister's Visit                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | ,                                                                                               |
| INF is likely to head the agenda of Defense M<br>discussions tomorrow and on Thursday with US offici                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                                                                                                 |
| Lagorio, a Socialist, had only limited defense issues when appointed in 1980, and establishment initially regarded him with scording to US officials in Rome, however, Defense Minister now range from grudging reguarded admiration.                                                                                                                                                          | the defense<br>suspicion. Ac-<br>views on the                                                   |
| The Defense Minister has emerged as a cate for the military and a man whose polithas enabled him to score successes against Under his leadership, Italy has participate national forces in the Sinai and Lebanon, tary aid to Somalia, facilitated the US Rafforce, and supported NATO INF modernization                                                                                       | tical agility strong odds. ed in the multi- provided mili- pid_Deployment                       |
| Comment: Lagorio will reassure US of Italy remains determined to deploy ground-missiles on schedule. At the same time, he reflect Rome's concern about the impact on of recent Soviet proposals, and he probably that the West has to show flexibility on to option" while retaining it as a final goal want to sound out US officials on the quest control for ground-launched cruise missile | launched cruise e is likely to West Europeans y will argue he "zero . He also may tion of joint |
| Defense cooperation is another major Lagorio presumably is pleased about US eff clude a contract with an Italian firm for C-130san agreement that would require th sever business ties with Libya. He will p for additional efforts to end what he sees street in weapons sales.                                                                                                               | orts to con-<br>repair of<br>e firm to<br>ush, however,                                         |
| Other topics are likely to include ex multinational force in Lebanon, better sec nuclear weapons facilities, and Rome's des arms and equipment built under US license tries as Iran, Iraq, and Libya. Lagorio a Italian perceptions of a growing Soviet an in the Mediterranean and US operations in waters that could heighten tensions.                                                      | urity for US ire to sell to such coun- lso might raise d Libyan threat                          |
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YUGOSLAVIA: Implications of Bakaric's Death

Rival Croatian politicians are in the midst of a struggle to replace Vice President Bakaric, the last of Tito's inner circle, who died over the weekend. Bakaric was the last person to hold positions simultaneously in the highest federal and party bodies. The US Consulate in Zagreb believes that Mika Spiljak, a 66-year-old Croat, is the leading candidate to replace Bakaric on the collective federal presidency and to serve a one-year term as president, while former Foreign Minister Vrhovec is a likely choice to take Bakaric's seat on the party presidium.

Comment: The death of Bakaric, whose authority was based on his ties to Tito and his prominence in federal councils, removes an important element of political stability. As his successors compete to replace him, they will stress the need to put Croatian interests ahead of federal concerns. This will make it even more difficult for Belgrade to resolve its financial, economic, and political problems.

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ITALY: Labor Unrest

A nationwide general strike organized by the United Labor Federations is scheduled to take place today to protest the government's new austerity program. Until now, workers have reacted with a series of wildcat strikes, demonstrations, and local union activity. In one incident in Rome, seven strikers were injured during a melee with police that the press has characterized as the most serious incident of its kind in 10 years.

Comment: The general strike could be the six-week-old government's most serious test to date. Unhappiness over the austerity package is widespread in the fragile four-party coalition. Prime Minister Fanfani's government could easily dissolve if the strike produces a combination of serious violence, property damage, injuries, or deaths.

NICARAGUA: Opposition To Suspend Talks

The opposition's Democratic Coordinating Board reportedly plans to boycott future discussions with the Sandinistas about a new law governing political parties. The decision is based on recent press censorship of an article criticizing the draft and on an incident in which an opposition leader was not allowed to return to Nicaragua after making public criticisms abroad. The opposition also is concerned about the deaths of two activists under suspicious circumstances.

Comment: Opposition leaders are convinced the proposed law would serve only to consolidate the regime's rule, despite its assurances the draft is subject to modification. If the government offers to compromise, however, they probably would be tempted to resume participation. Regardless of the opposition's position, the Sandinistas are likely to proceed with their timetable for holding elections in 1985.

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
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| VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA: Military Operations                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Vietnamese forces last week attacked and overran a lightly defended Democratic Kampuchean division head-quarters complex along the Thai border  The Vietnamese briefly occupied some high ground in Thailand, provoking several encounters         |
| with Thai troops. In separate action on Sunday, the Vietnamese forced troops of the non-Communist Khmer People's National Liberation Front from the last of several forward positions near Nong Chan that they had occupied since late last month. |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
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NAMIBIA: New Government

The leaders of Namibia's largely powerless Democratic Turnhalle Alliance government are scheduled to resign today, and South African officials say their Administrator General will rule with the aid of an advisory council. Pretoria initially sponsored the Alliance in the mid-1970s to create a political force that could protect white interests and challenge the South-West Africa People's Organization in UN-sponsored elections. Pretoria denied the Alliance the authority to tamper with white dominance in the territory, however, and it consequently never won support among Namibia's predominantly black population.

Comment: South Africa probably will move slowly to create a successor government, but when it does, it may signal its longer term intentions. Allowing the whites to remain dominant would indicate that Pretoria is not yet willing to pay the political costs of granting independence. On the other hand, promoting black leaders and allowing white control to diminish would suggest a willingness to grant independence, probably through a UN-sponsored settlement.

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| INTERNATIONAL: Results of Nonaligned Meeting                                                                     |
| The communique ignued by the Nonaligned meeting last                                                             |
| The communique issued by the Nonaligned meeting last                                                             |
| week in Managua criticizes US policy in Central America less harshly than Nonaligned chairman Cuba and Nicaragua |
| had proposed. The Sandinistas used the conference, how-                                                          |
| ever, to develop domestic support for the government.                                                            |
| Sandinista propaganda and mass rallies publicized the                                                            |
| conference as a demonstration of international solidarity                                                        |
| with the Nicaraguan revolution.                                                                                  |
| With the Middleguan 197014010                                                                                    |
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| Special Analysis                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |   |
| ISRAEL-JORDAN: Tel Aviv's Concerns                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |   |
| Prime Minister Begin's government, after some initial skepticism, is beginning to take seriously reports that Jordan's King Hussein is close to a decision to join the peace process. Tel Aviv fears that Washington and Amman have already worked out a common approach to negotiations that has not been shared with Israel.                                                                 | 2 |
| Until recently, the Israelis believed that Hussein, although enthusiastic about the US peace plan, could not obtain the Arab and PLO backing he needed to join the talks. They were confident that Hussein's likely refusal would put the blame for a negotiating stalemate on the Arabs and convince the US that the Camp David process provides the only workable framework for peace talks. | 2 |
| The Israelis agreed to a Jordanian role when the Camp David framework was negotiated in 1978. They would be apprehensive about a decision by Hussein to join now, however, because they believe this could come only as a result of US promises that Jordan would eventually get back most of the West Bank.                                                                                   | 2 |
| Begin is considering how to react to such a move by Hussein. He is particularly worried that the King-with US supportwill demand a freeze on settlements as a precondition.                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 2 |
| Reaction to a Freeze Proposal                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |   |
| Begin's most immediate concern is that the US will bring substantial pressure to bear on Israel to agree to such a condition. Begin is emotionally committed to the settlements program. He told a US official last week that he would not agree to a freeze before opening any negotiations with Jordan.                                                                                      | 2 |
| Rightwing members of Begin's coalition will oppose any acceptance of such a condition. The ultraconservative Tehiyya Party, which has three seats in the Knesset,                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |   |
| continued                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |   |
| Top Secret  12  18 January 1983                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | 2 |

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| almost certainly would leave the coal of the Prime Minister's own Herut Par Religious Party might follow, serious parliamentary margin.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | cty and the National                                                                        | 25X         |
| At the same time, there would be pressure not to pass up an historic of with Jordan and a possible solution of problem. Moreover, Begin himself would be another with the US.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | opportunity for peace<br>to the Palestinian<br>ald be reluctant to                          | 25X         |
| Begin's Response                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |                                                                                             |             |
| These considerations make it like deflect pressure for a freeze by elaboration that Hussein would the object would be to get Hussein be cult negotiations over conditions for while the Israelis refine their strategies.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | porating a series of distance to accept. Dogged down in diffi-<br>or opening the talks      | 25X         |
| Israel might try to exercise a value tion of Palestinian delegates. Last Sharon said Israel would not accept I those who speak for them as members delegation to the talks.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | week Defense Minister<br>PLO supporters or                                                  | 25X         |
| Begin also could insist that Hushis adherence to the Camp David accordance to the tions. By raising these issues, Begin to get Hussein to agree to Israel's autonomy or to dissuade him from entering the second statement of | rds and agree to a<br>e subject to negotia-<br>in would hope either<br>narrow definition of |             |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |                                                                                             | 25X         |
| One cabinet minister has suggest Hussein for a settlements freeze supply would be a violation of the Camp Davibe cause for Israel's abrogation of probably would be reluctant to do the of US criticism and likely adverse do                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | ported by the US id accords and would the agreement. Begin is, however, because             |             |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |                                                                                             | 25X1        |
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| Other Options                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |             |
| If faced with a demand for a freeze, Begin could ask for early elections and a national referendum on his decision to accept or reject Hussein's conditions. The Prime Minister has on several occasions expressed his preference for early elections but has been blocked by coalition partners who fear they would lose seats. These parties, however, probably would be unable to resist a call by Begin for early elections on the issue of a freeze. | 25X         |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | 20/         |
| Such a move also would have the advantage of post-<br>poning any decision until at least early fall. The<br>Israelis probably assume that by then political activity<br>in the US will mean less pressure on them for concessions.                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | 25X         |
| If Begin believed his back was to the wall, he might act to increase tensions in Lebanon or with Syria. Either move would be aimed at distracting attention from the peace process and creating new inter-Arab strains that would make it difficult for Hussein to join the negotiations.                                                                                                                                                                 | 25 <b>X</b> |
| The Drive Minister also sould drag out the Israel-                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |             |
| The Prime Minister also could drag out the Israel-<br>Lebanon negotiations and stall on troop withdrawals.<br>Hussein would be unlikely to enter the negotiations unless<br>there were some evidence of progress on withdrawals.                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | 25X1        |
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